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1. Introduction
The Selective Draft Law Cases of 1918 present a challenge to constitutional
scholars. In his opinion in these consolidated cases, Chief Justice Edward
Douglass White endorsed the constitutionality of the conscription law adopted
by the United States upon its entry into World War I. But he did so most anom-
alously, grounding his opinion principally on the doctrine of state necessity as
explained and expounded by the Continental legal theorist Emmerich Vattel and
only secondarily on the American Constitution itself.
This article seeks to unpack this strange-looking-looking constitutional deci-
sion regarding aWar long forgotten bymost Americans. It will consider first the
constitutional background to American conscription. It will then look some
salient facts about Chief Justice White – especially focused on his military
record, his training as a civilian, and his sophisticated use of Roman law as a sit-
ting judge. The article then examines the structure of White’s opinion in the
Selective Draft Law Cases and reviews the jurisprudential premises that gov-
erned his reasoning. The article closes with a discussion of the jurisprudential
world in which he operated – one very different from the highly positivistic one
that prevails today.
2. Conscription: Its Constitutional Background
In late 1916 and early 1917, onlymonths after winning re-election on the cam-
paign slogan «HeKept UsOut ofWar», PresidentWoodrowWilson and his advi-
sors readied a proposed Selective Service Act for submission to Congress should
it be needed. Using euphemistic language (“Selective Service” avoided the politi-
cally-risky vocabulary of “draft” or “conscription”), the Act meant to ensure that
the Armed Forces had a ready supply of young men to fight inWorldWar I1.
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Indeed, in early 1917, theUnited Stateswaswoefully unready to fight amajor
European War. In 1914, at the outbreak of European hostilities, the Army had
fewer than 100,000 active duty personnel. And while Congress had taken some
small steps to increase the Army’s size, the numbers had barely budged by
January, 19172.
In the early spring of 1917, Germany resorted to unrestricted submarinewar-
fare upon neutral shipping as a last desperate measure to put Great Britain in a
chokehold. In March, 1917 alone, five American merchant ships were sunk, and
President Wilson, his patience exhausted, requested Congress declare war on
Germany and her allies3. War was declared on April 6, 1917, and a few weeks
later, on May 18, Congress enacted the Selective Service Act of 19174.
The Act’s passage was greeted by a tidal wave of protest. Socialist leader and
perennial presidential candidate Eugene Victor Debs denounced the draft and
was imprisoned5. Emma Goldman, the Russian immigrant anarchist and femi-
nist, urged people to resist conscription andwas also systematically prosecuted6.
Riots, violence, and active subversion occurred in a number of places7. Soon
enough, the Selective Service Act was made the subject of a constitutional
challenge.
In truth, the American constitutional order never contemplated widescale
involuntary conscription. A Yale Law Journal article dryly summarized what
has been a consistent American attitude toward the draft: «The Selective Service
System is the only government institution outside the criminal courts with the
power to condemn a man to possible death»8.
During the Revolutionary War, General George Washington called upon
the Continental Congress to conscript men, and while some states responded to
this summons with local drafts, these efforts were not widespread nor very suc-
cessful9.
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While conscription was never directly raised as a concern at the time of the
American Founding and the Constitution is officially silent on the matter, there
was raised, during the drafting and ratification debates, a strong fear of «stand-
ing armies»10. A large, permanent military establishment was seen as a threat to
individual liberty and conscription only served to make this danger even more
vividly real11. As finally ratified, the United States Constitution merely granted
Congress the power to raise an Army with no instructions on how to do it12.
The need for manpower during the War of 1812 prompted the first national
discussions on conscription. Although Congress tried many inducements to
recruit volunteers, the American war effort suffered chronic unmet needs for
well-trained soldiers13. In the fall of 1814, at the request of Senator William B.
Giles of Virginia, Secretary of State James Monroe proposed conscription legis-
lation to Congress14.
The young New Englander, DanielWebster, who would go on to arguemore
than 200 cases before the United States Supreme Court and gain respect as
among the greatest constitutional thinkers15, stood on the floor of theU.S. House
of Representatives to denounce the proposed legislation. The billmust be defeat-
ed, Webster declaimed, because it demanded the «surrender» of «the most
essential rights of personal liberty» while «embrac[ing]» «despotism (…) in its
worst form»16. A draft conferred upon the government «a power more tyranni-
cal, more arbitrary, more dangerous, more allied to blood andmurder, more full
of every form ofmischief, more productive of every sort of misery, than has been
exercised by any civilized government, with one exception, in modern times»17.
Monroe’s proposal was never enacted into law.
The CivilWar saw both sides resort to conscription. The Confederacy passed
far-reaching conscription legislation in 186218, and the Union followed suit in
March, 186319. Conscription met with resistance in both the North and the
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18 See generally W.L. Shaw, The Confederate Conscription and Exemption Acts, in «American
Journal of Legal History», 6 (1962), pp. 369-405.
19 The Enrolment Act, ch. xxxv, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
South, but it was in the North, whose law was particularly raw in its class
favoritism, where violence broke out. The Union law permitted wealthier con-
scripts to hire substitutes to serve in their place but made no accommodations
for poor draftees20 – and poor young menmet the call to arms in the summer of
1863withmayhemand rioting, especially inNewYork City21. Although the ques-
tion was never litigated in the federal courts,22 Roger Taney, the sitting Chief
Justice, wrote in his private capacity to advise Congress that he believed the
Enrolment Act to be unconstitutional23.
After this unfortunate history, conscription lapsed for half a century, until
that fateful winter of 1916/1917, whenWilson and his advisors girded for war.
3. Edward Douglass White
In December, 1917, the Supreme Court considered a consolidated appeal
involving several challenges to the draft raised in different parts of the country.
Edward DouglassWhite, the Chief Justice, authored a single opinion responsive
to these different cases, which issued in early January, 191824. White, then aged
seventy-two and nearing the close of his career, was unique among justices of the
Supreme Court in that he remains to this day the only trained civilian to serve on
the nation’s highest court.
White had been born into a prominent political family in 1845. His father,
Edward, Sr., seventy years old when young Edward was born, had been a force
in Louisiana politics for decades, serving as a local judge, a representative to
Congress, and as governor. His wife Catherine, Edward’s mother, hailed from a
wealthy Catholic family with deep roots in Maryland25.
Descended from an aristocracy of wealth and connections on both sides,
White was the beneficiary of the best Catholic education available. He was
tutored by Jesuits inNewOrleans, and afterwards received a higher education at
Mount St.Mary’s College in Emmitsburg,Maryland, andGeorgetownUniversity
in the District of Columbia26.
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26 Highsaw, Edward Douglass White, p. 18.
He left college in 1863, however, to enlist in the Confederate Army. He was
taken prisoner of war, however, near the end of theWar, which brought his mil-
itary ambitions to their proper conclusion27. Years later, he expressed fervent
gratitude that the South had lost the Civil War28.
Following the War, White studied law and entered politics. He learned law
by reading it in the office of Edward Bermudez, a gifted Romanist who was him-
self descended from Spanish aristocracy, an ancestor having served as Spanish
Minister of State and ambassador to France29. Bermudez was a worthy mentor
to White, being himself one of the most accomplished civil lawyers of his day,
serving on the Louisiana Supreme Court from 1880 to his death in 1892.
White swiftly ascended to the pinnacle of Louisiana’s governing structure.
He was elected to the State Senate in 1874, at the age of twenty-nine. He was
appointed to the State Supreme Court in 1878 but required to step down two
years later, when an age limit was adopted making him ineligible to serve. He
assisted in the founding of Tulane University and briefly served in the
University’s administration. He cultivated relationships in the American
Catholic hierarchy, especially with James Cardinal Gibbon and the Jesuit Order,
for which he retained a life-long fondness. In 1891, this careful coalition-build-
ing paid off when the Louisiana legislature elected White to the United States
Senate30. A mere two-and-one-half years later, furthermore, thanks to his own
good luck and the misfortune of two more prominent rivals31, White was
appointed to the Supreme Court, first as Associate Justice and then elevated, in
1910, to the rank of Chief Justice32.
As a Louisiana-trained civilian, White often used Roman law sources in his
opinions and relied on Romanist texts and commentaries on a number of occa-
sions as a principal foundation of his constitutional reasoning33. The Selective
Draft Law Cases are a prominent example of this practice, but hardly the only
instance. InCoffin v. United States, White concluded that the Constitutionman-
dated a presumption of innocence in criminal cases and found support for this
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holding in Justinian’s texts and the literary work of AmmianusMarcellinus34. In
Cubbins v.Mississippi River Commission,White looked to commentaries on the
Code Napoléon to justify the building of private levees on the banks of the
Mississippi River35.
In Geer v. Connecticut, a case famous among environmental lawyers for its
expansive recognition of state regulatory power36, White supported his holding
by reference to the powers Roman law granted the sovereign in its control of ani-
mals ferae naturae37. And in Cunnius v. Reading School District, White once
again relied on nineteenth-century commentaries on French and Roman law to
resolve thorny property questions in a presumption of death case where, after an
absence of many years, the party declared dead suddenly returned home, quite
alive and well38.
Usage of foreign law, especially Romanistmaterials andContinental jurispru-
dence, was a steady feature of White’s opinion writing. And it his employment of
these sources in the Selective Draft Law Cases that is considered next.
4. The Selective Draft Law Cases
The petitioners’ brief in the Selective Draft Law Cases aimed to build the
case that conscription was incompatible with ancestral notions of Anglo-
American liberty. To that end, the brief sketched a historiography, extending
from the medieval Saxons to the English Glorious Revolution, attempting to
show that there ran a deep aversion in the tradition to standing armies and the
concentrated governmental power they represented39. This aversion was second
nature to the Framers and the reason they did not include conscription in the
Constitution. For confirmation, the brief turned to Daniel Webster’s denuncia-
tion of conscription during theWar of 181240. The brief even distinguished Civil-
War conscription from that imposed by the World War I statute by noting that
individuals could buy their way out of the earlier draft by hiring a substitute41.
But now, «for the first time in the history of this nation Congress attempts to
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34 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. (1895), pp. 432, 452-460.
35 Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission, 241 U.S. (1916), pp. 351, 363-366
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39 Authored by T.E. Latimer, Herbert Dunn, and Frank Healy, the brief asserted that England’s
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hensively by the professional military assembled by the Tudor and Stuart monarchs. The English
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theAmericanRevolution ninety years later. See Brief of Plaintiff-in-Error,Arver v.United States, no.
663 (December, 1917). Arver was the first named plaintiff in the consolidated cases reviewed by the
Court.
40 Ibidem, pp. 11-12.
41 Ibidem, p. 13.
provide for the raising of a regular army, an organization [supposedly] based
upon voluntary enlistment, by conscription»42. This step amounted to involun-
tary servitude under the Thirteenth Amenment and effectively re-established on
American shores the despotism of late Stuart England43.
The government’s brief appeared under the name of John W. Davis, the
nation’s Solicitor General. Davis was one of the greatest lawyers of his genera-
tion, and the Democratic nominee for President in 1924, although today he is
remembered chiefly for his ignominious role in arguing on behalf of the segre-
gationists in Brown v. Board of Education44.
The opening portion of Davis’s brief consisted of a series of inferences that
led inexorably to a governmental power to conscript young men for the armed
forces. «The highest duty of every citizen is to serve his country in time of
need», the brief opened45. One could view conscriptions from each of two
perspectives, Davis continued – either as an obligation of citizenship or as a
necessary power of the State46. True, he acknowledged, the Constitution did not
provide affirmatively for conscription among its enumerated powers, but it also
did not prohibit the practice and logic demanded its acceptance47.
With bravado masking an absence of direct constitutional authority, Davis
asserted: «Only sheer hardihood would seriously deny that among the appro-
priate means to which Congress may resort in raising armies is the selective
draft»48. Davis contended that the Constitution had to be interpreted in light
of the necessities of modern states. Thus the United States possessed all of the
powers of a sovereign nation and like other sovereigns – Canada, Great
Britain, the South African Republic, the German Empire – it had the power to
compel men to serve in the military49. He dismissed the claim of involuntary
servitude, asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment had to be read narrowly,
as eliminating chattel slavery and as contributing nothing on the subject of
conscription50.
Davis’s arguments were convincing to White. As he justified his decision to
uphold the draft, he viewed the case as involving a clash of two rival and incom-
patible principles as to the relationship of the individual to themodern state. The
claims of the draft resisters,White declared, would exalt the individual above the
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42 Ibidem, p. 16.
43 Ibidem, pp. 19-25.
44 On Davis’s career, see W.H. Harbaugh, Lawyer’s Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis, New York
1973. Davis did not merely present a lawyer’s brief favoring school segregation, he endorsed it as an
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cial discretion and disturbance». L.L. Gould, Born With His Trousers Creased, in «Yale Law
Journal», 83 (1974), pp. 866, 875 (quoting Davis).
45 Brief For the United States, Ruthenberg v. United States, nos. 656 et al., December, 1917.
46 Ibidem, pp. 10-11.
47 Ibidem, p. 13.
48 Ibidem, p. 14.
49 Ibidem, pp. 16-17.
50 Ibidem, pp. 63-64.
state and this would lead to anarchy51. Trust individual decision-making on a
matter this important and the military itself might disappear52.
When the Constitution conferred power on Congress to raise an army, there-
fore, it must have implicitly granted the authority to compel the needed man-
power. To support this proposition,White turned to thework of Emmerich Vattel
(1714-1767). Vattel, a Swiss legal scholar who wrote in French53, was enjoying
something of a renaissance in the middle 1910s54. Charles G. Fenwick, the emi-
nent Catholic scholar of international law55, had written a pair of influential arti-
cles on Vattel and had prepared a newFrench edition of his work for the Carnegie
Institution56. JohnW. Davis, furthermore, had cited Vattel in his brief57.
Vattel must have seemed like a convenient authority since he built a power-
ful case, on the basis of the logic of state necessity, for conscription. «No person
is naturally exempt from taking up arms in defence of the state», wrote Vattel58.
«A good government», he continued, would direct its human resources into
those «posts and employments» in a way «that the state may be most effectual-
ly served in all its affairs»59. Reading and citing the chapter in which these com-
ments were contained, White endorsed Vattel’s views and concluded: «It may
not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the
citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service
in case of need and the right to compel it»60. Thus a constitutional provision that
authorized Congress to raise an army but was silent as to means came to be
interpreted as requiring, as a logical corollary, a military draft where the needs
of the nation mandated it.
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51 245U.S. p. 378 (claim based on individual liberty «is so devoid of foundation that it leaves not even
a shadow of a ground upon which to base the conclusion»). Ibidem.
52 Ibidem, p. 377 («As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose it, on the face
of the Constitution the objection that it does not give power to provide for such men would seem to
be too frivolous for further notice»).
53 On Vattel’s background, see M.G. Forsyth, H.M.A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear, The Theory of
International Relations: Selected Texts FromGentili to Treitschke, London 1970, pp. 87-88. Vattel’s
principal work, Le droit des gens, was translated as The Law of Nations (Philadelphia 1863).
54 Interest in Vattel has recently been revived. See D.G. Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic:
The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power, Baton Rouge, LA, 1985, pp. 13-33; and P. Onuf and
N. Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814,
Madison, WI, 1993, pp. 1-26. Onuf and Logan both maintain that Vattel was read and recommend-
ed by some members of the founding generation, but White nowhere in his opinion makes the orig-
inalist claim that Vattel was important in 1918 because he had been important in 1789.
55 OnFenwick, seeCharlesG. FenwickDies at 92;Was International LawExpert, in «TheNewYork
Times», April 26, 1973; J.R. Hailey, Dr. Charles G. Fenwick Dies, in «The Washington Post», April
26, 1973.
56 See Ch.G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, Part I, in «American Political Science Review», 7
(1913), pp. 395-410; and Ch.G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, Part II, in «American Political
Science Review», 8 (1914). Cf. Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des gens: ou Principes de la loi
naturelle, edited by Ch.G. Fenwick and A. Geouffre de Lapradelle, eds., 3 volumes, Washington, DC,
1916.
57 Brief for the United States, supra, pp. 9-10.
58 Vattel, Law of Nations, supra, p. 294.
59 Ibidem.
60 245 U.S. p. 378 (citing Vattel, Law of Nations, Bk. III, chapters one and two).
What prompted White to rely on Vattel in this way? What led him to such
statist premises? White may well have felt some attraction since Vattel was a
French writer and White, fluent in French, made frequent use of francophone
sources in his judicial opinions. But it is probable that White had other motives,
also, for taking the turn he did.
5. The Historical Progress of the Law
A main current of early twentieth-century jurisprudence stressed the cen-
trality of a progressive model of legal history. The history of law was more than
a mere curiosity. A lawyer immersed in the rich data of the past could find there
guidance for how life must be governed in the here and now. «Understanding
current law», this school of thoughtmaintained, «depend[ed] on tracing its evo-
lution from its earliest origins»61.
This mode of thinking, called by its practitioners “historical jurisprudence”,
was traceable to the writings of the English statesman Edmund Burke and the
German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny, although its roots were sunk deep in
the soil of Tudor-Stuart legal history62. Historical jurisprudence stressed the cul-
tural experiences of the group – the people, the Volk, the nation, or the civiliza-
tion. Depending on the motives of its practitioners, historical jurisprudence
might manifest itself in narrow-minded provincialism, heated nationalism, or,
on the other hand, an openness to comparative study63. Common to all of this,
however, was a commitment to normativity – the past mattered because in
important ways it continued to bind us today.
Anglo-American historical jurisprudes of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries overwhelmingly understood the law to be struggling, through trial
and error, in historical time, toward certain beneficial ends. When Henry
Sumner Maine recited the story of the growth of sophisticated legal institutions,
he told it as the inevitable progress from status to contract. Western civilization
began in a straightjacket-like rigidity, in which all of our relations were defined
for us by our birth and our station in life, to a fluid, openmodern society inwhich
we define relations for ourselves, through our to power to contract with others64.
While Maine operated on the level of grand theory, this historical teleolo-
gy could also focus more specifically on particular legal or political institu-
tions. Thus when JohnMaxcy Zane authored his treatise on banking law, seek-
ing not only to restate but to redefine its content, he began with the confluence
of historical legal doctrines – bailment, trust, contract – that helped form
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62 See generally H.J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, in «Yale
Law Journal», 103 (1994), pp. 1651-1738.
63 Reid, Edward Douglass White, supra, pp. 309-310.
64 H.S. Maine, Ancient Law, London 1861, pp. 99-100.
modern banking practice. From these primitive elements, he contended, the
law of banking progressed and all future reform must keep true to these his-
torical sources65.
This was a world in which it was impossible for lawyers not to think histori-
cally. And, as noted above, this mode of thought was often nationalistic, or at
least tribal. This tribalism manifested itself, among Anglo-American lawyers, in
a readiness to celebrate the superiority of their own tradition. James Barr Ames,
the great popularizer of casebooks and Dean of the Harvard Law School, saw his
mission as the doing of “genealogy”66. And that genealogy led back to Germany:
«The English law is more German than the law of Germany itself»67.
By this, Amesmeant to compare and contrast the commitment of the Anglo-
American tradition to freedom, to justice, and to progress with those legal sys-
tems that had come under the influence of Romanist modes of thought. Ames
was far from alone in making this argument. John Forrest Dillon saw the roots
of America’s free institutions in the the «love of personal freedom and inde-
pendence» of the ancient Germans68. James Coolidge Carter praised the «har-
monious blending of law and liberty» found in the American system in contrast
to the civilian where the old «maxim that law proceeds from the pleasure of the
sovereign» still prevails69.
World War I obviously diminished the enthusiasm for the Germanic foun-
dations of American law, but, if anything, it strengthened the nationalism of
American jurists70.White’s assertion of continental sources acted as a subtle cor-
rective to these trends. For the sources he wished to promote were neither
Germanic nor natively Anglo-American. He sought, rather, to read romanist tra-
ditions into the American constitutional order. He did this with Coffin and
Cubbins, Cunnius and Geer. And he was doing it again with the Selective Draft
Act Cases. As only an American romanist who simultaneously sat as a judge on
America’s highest tribunal could appreciate,White grasped the essential unity of
Western law. I myself have quarrels with the outcome in the Selective Draft Act
Cases. I remain convinced that the proper way to handle conscription is by con-
stitutional amendment, not judicial opinion71. But despite personal misgivings
about his support for conscription, I esteemWhite’s larger project, his ambition
of integrating Anglo-American and Continental jurisprudence through a sophis-
ticated expansion of legal sources.
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6. Conclusion
The conscription law so fervently defended by Davis and White was, like its
Civil-War antecedent, only haphazardly enforced. In a mobile society lacking
sophisticated means of tracking its residents, it is estimated that somewhere
between 300,000 and threemillion youngmen avoidedmilitary service,most by
the simple expedients of remaining mobile and refusing to register72. Still, if one
judges the legislation by the success of the War effort, it can be said to have
achieved its purposes.
Today, the case stands also as a reminder that members of the United States
Supreme Court have often resorted to the use of foreign legal sources in the res-
olution of leading cases. This should barely warrantmention at all, except for the
fact that eight or nine years ago, members of the Supreme Court debated this
point vigorously, conservative members of the court viewing reliance on foreign
law as a kind of unconstrained extra-constitutional reasoning. This internal
debate stimulated a large scholarly response and it seems that the Court is no
longer keen to argue this point73.
Most important for our purposes, however, most significant in a volume
honoring the many great accomplishments of Mario Ascheri, is the unity that
this case reveals in Western law. America and Europe might be separated by an
ocean, our legal traditions may have depended upon different sources, but still
one can find the great bridge-builders. Chief Justice EdwardDouglassWhitewas
one such bridger of continents. And Mario Ascheri is another.
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